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Abstract: Numerous proposals have been made for separation in the telecommunications 
sector, some of which have been implemented, including the break-up of the Bell system 
in the 1980s and the widespread implementation of accounting separation. In recent 
years, attention has been focussed on operational separation. This paper identifies the 
problem that this is intended to tackle, lists a number of possible variants and discusses 
experiences in the UK. Having specified the circumstances under which operational 
separation may be justified, it suggests how provisions for such separation could be made 
in European legislation. 
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he idea of separating incumbent telecommunication firms as a 
regulatory device to combat dominance and promote competition has 
a twenty-year history. The break up of the U.S. Bell system in 1984 
into local and long distance components was a spectacular inauguration of 
the process, which was accurately described by a well-known U.S. 
commentator shortly afterwards as "a reckless gamble – which paid off". In 
the 1990s attention turned in Europe to two alternative forms of separation- 
some form of horizontal separation between different platforms, and vertical 
accounting separation of different components in the telecommunication 
value chain, such as retail, wholesale or access. The1995 Cable Directive 
sought to ensure ownership separation between the telecommunication and 
cable networks in EU member states. It had mixed success. Deutsche 
Telekom finally sold off its last cable networks in 2004, but common 
ownership of cable and telecom networks is still observed in Denmark, 
Portugal and (outside Europe) in Australia. Accounting separation of the 
telecommunications incumbent value chain became, however, a standard 
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and significant weapon in the regulators' armoury, when accompanied by a 
rigorous examination of the operator's cost allocations. 
Attention refocused upon more radical forms of separation than the 
accounting variety in the current decade. In BT's early years several of its 
competitors in the UK- notably Cable and Wireless- called for the break up of 
the incumbent into variously specified wholesale and retail components, 
which would fall under separate ownership. This general proposition 
received a mixed response from commentators, the division being neatly 
illustrated by the OECD, two separate committees of which at one time 
expressed opposing views on the subject. In the absence of any regulatory 
attempt to achieve ownership separation of this kind (no doubt influenced by 
the absence, in most EU countries, of a viable procedure for accomplishing 
it) attention has swung back to a form of separation intermediate between 
the accounting variety and ownership or structural separation. An 
'operational' or 'functional' separation of this kind (the former term will be 
used here) has been achieved in the United Kingdom, and, in a recent 
speech, the European Commissioner for the Information Society and 
Broadcasting has clearly ruled it in as a possible element in the review of 
European regulatory arrangements due to take effect in 2010. As 
Commissioner Reding said on June 27th 2006 (using the term structural 
separation to include operational separation in particular): 
"I believe that the policy option of structural separation could answer 
many of the competition problems that Europe's telecoms markets are 
still facing today. Perhaps we have to be as radical as regulators were 
in the USA in the 1980s to make real progress? Of course, we will 
have to find our own European solutions, adapted to the needs of our 
continent. But 'a European way of structural separation' is certainly a 
policy option that needs to be discussed intensively in the forthcoming 
months." (Reding, 2006) 
It is thus likely that some form of regulator-enforced operational 
separation will play a role in the discussion of regulatory reform. 
This paper reviews options for operational separation. The first section 
identifies the problems that the regulatory remedy is designed to remedy. 
The following one considers the hierarchy (or ladder) of options for achieving 
operational separation. Then we give a brief account of UK experience, and 
the last section offers some tentative conclusions and proposals relevant to 
the new European regime. 
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  To what problems is separation a remedy? 
The answer to this question revolves around discrimination. Consider a 
vertically integrated incumbent providing a variety of narrowband and 
broadband services, untroubled by the presence of an alternative wire-based 
access network, such as cable. Regulation is likely to be applied under the 
existing European regulatory regime in the form of mandatory access (at 
either cost-based or 'reasonable' prices) to some of the incumbent's assets, 
such as the local loop, wholesale broadband access, call origination, 
termination and transit, leased lines etc. Such 'pro-competitive' regulation is 
seen as an increasingly viable alternative to 'consumer protection' regulation 
in the form of retail price controls. 
The success of this approach hinges upon the appropriateness of the 
terms and conditions of access to the assets in question. Discrimination by 
the incumbent in favour of its own retail affiliate will diminish the competitive 
constraints it faces in downstream markets from access seekers. 
Such discrimination can take two forms: price and non-price. Accounting 
separation is designed to ensure parity between transaction prices paid by 
competitors for access and accounting prices paid by the separated entity's 
downstream affiliate. Excessive prices will show up in excessive return 
carried by the access-providing component of the incumbent. A generalised 
margin squeeze might be illustrated by negative returns for the downstream 
unit. Of course such 'parity' is not complete in the sense that competitors' 
access payments are a genuine marginal cost for them, whereas the 
marginal cost of the same service to the vertically integrated incumbent is its 
marginal resource cost (the extra physical cost of producing one extra unit, 
translated into monetary units). The latter is likely to be much lower than the 
former, when access prices are based on long run average incremental cost, 
with mark up, while the production process exhibits economies of scale. 
Accounting separation might thus deal with price discrimination. But non-
price discrimination is a different matter. Much of the UK case in favour of 
operational separation rests on the proposition that BT had the means and 
the motive to practise non-prices discrimination in relation to such products 
as unbundled loops, wholesale line rental, and bitstream, had in fact done 
so, and was likely to persist in doing so (Ofcom, 2005; CAVE, CORREA & 
CROCIONI, 2006). The proposed remedy is a redesign of business 
processes, – operational separation – to ensure precisely equal treatment – 
'full equivalence' – for both internal and external purchasers of the same 
service. 
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Thus in principle, a combination of accounting and some form of 
operational separation might outlaw discrimination, both price and non-price. 
But is this always a legitimate objective. Can discrimination be desirable in 
any circumstances? 
The answer to this question depends on the overall regulatory strategy of 
which a non-discrimination remedy is a component. Roughly speaking, this 
is likely to involve a regime of mandated access, the form of which depends 
upon the replicability of the assets in question. If they are clearly non-
replicable, then a policy of cost-oriented pricing will probably be adopted. If 
they are more readily replicable, then a higher access price may be 
appropriate to encourage innovative investment by both the access provider 
and the access seekers. 
To be more concrete, consider unbundled local loops, an input the terms 
of supply of which (compared with 'bundled' loops) are likely to have a major 
effect on competitive developments in broadband. The effective prohibition 
of discrimination is likely to chill investment in competing loops, but it will 
encourage investment out to the local exchange. If the former effect 
predominates, then a policy of non-discriminatory cost-based pricing may 
hamper infrastructure investment in the long term. If the latter effect 
predominates, it will promote competitive investment. But either way, this 
issue should be addressed explicitly by the regulator, for example through 
the access pricing rule adopted. Leaving the solution to the vagaries of non-
compliance with anti-discrimination rules is not likely to be good regulation. 
  Separation options 
If separation has been chosen as a regulatory measure, then two 
dimensions of it have to be defined, one structural, the other behavioural. 
Firstly the separated components (retail, wholesale; monopoly, competitive) 
have to be defined. Then rules governing transactions over these 
boundaries have to be established. 
The logic of the argument in the previous section is that what has to be 
policed is the boundary between markets where the incumbent exercises 
persistent market power (and hence can discriminate with anti-competitive 
effect) and markets which are competitive. It follows from this that the 
appropriate division depends upon current and predictable market 
developments. 
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There is a crucial question of priorities. In Europe, proposals for 
operational separation focus on current generation access networks - 
notably copper loops providing ADSL. Telecom New Zealand, by contract, 
has proposed focussing its separation efforts, aimed at achieving full 
equivalence between third party buyers of access services and its own retail 
affiliate, on next generation networks (NGNs) (TCNZ, 2006). The context of 
this article is primarily current generation networks.  
In discussions of separation, the two principal candidates for making the 
split are between retail and wholesale and between access and non-access 
services. Underlying this is a three-way split as follows: 




Core network services 
Call origination, termination, transit etc 




Unbundled local loops 
Wholesale line rental 
Some backhaul  
Tail segments of leased lines 
At this very high level of aggregation, it is hard to identify persistent 
competition problems with retailing or core network services. Other network 
products may present harder, but not insoluble problems. Where such 
problems are likely to be found is in access services in areas without cable 
or effective wireless networks. The intermediate function is backhaul, which 
will probably be (actually or potentially) competitive in some areas but not in 
others. This issue acquires particular significance because backhaul is one 
element (together with the local loop) in wholesale broadband access or 
bitstream. A national bitstream product will include all backhaul, while a 
regional  product will enable the purchaser to provide its own backhaul, at 
least from selected regions. 
On the basis of these arguments, the balance of advantage seems to lie 
heavily with an access/non-access separation, leaving wholesale broadband 
access in an uncomfortable half-way house position, to be resolved on the 
basis of individual market conditions. 
The second step in establishing a separation regime is to specify the 
behaviour required. In one sense, the focus should be transactions on the 
boundary between the separated components, but the objective of achieving 
non-discrimination here may have to be supported by wider-ranging 
constraints on the separated entity. 
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Figure 1 below contains a specification of separation options varying from 
accounting separation at the bottom of the 'ladder' to partial or full ownership 
separation at the top. 
Figure 1 - Separation options 
Ownership separation(in whole or part) 
6-Legal separation (separate legal entities under the same ownership) 
5-Business separation with separate governance arrangements 
4-Business separation with localised  incentives 
3-Business separation (BS) 
2-Virtual separation 
1-Creation of a wholesale division 
Accounting separation 
The focus here is on the six degrees lying between (and excluding) 
accounting separation and ownership separation. These options are now 
described in more detail. 
Accounting separation itself entails separate profit and loss statements 
and balance sheets for the separate entities. This can be accompanied by 
the creation of a special wholesale (or otherwise named) unit, with a 
dedicated management (1 in fig. 1). This will be responsible at a managerial 
level for the production and supply of the relevant products, but with no 
guarantee, at this degree of separation, of non-discrimination between 
affiliated and competitive access seekers. This is broadly the modus 
operandi of European telecommunications incumbents at present (with the 
exception of BT – see below). 
Under this regime, the regulator can make attempts to ensure some 
loose equivalence between services to affiliated units and to competitors. 
However these efforts are hampered by two factors in particular: 
• The absence of a clean target level of equivalence – an ambiguity that 
leads to opportunities for the incumbent to continue to discriminate; 
• The fact that the incumbent's network, IT system and business 
processes were broadly designed within the context of a fully integrated firm 
supplying end users directly, but not supplying access services to third 
parties. Access products were grafted onto this framework, through the 
adoption of special procedures and technological fixes. This provided a 
means of introducing discrimination, which was obviously attractive if the 
commercial motive to discriminate were present. 
A variant of the wholesale division which has surfaced in Australia is 
Telstra's proposal for operational separation, now accepted by the Australian 
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Government. This involves creating a separate wholesale division dealing 
exclusively with access seekers – the supply of the same products to the 
company's retail side being accommodated in an integrated framework 
(Telstra, 2006). This approach seems singularly ill-equipped to achieve any 
kind of equivalence in the services offered by to internal and external 
customers, as it exaggerates the differences in institutional arrangements 
between them. In any case, these considerations suggest that creation of a 
wholesale division by itself will be ineffective. 
The next variant to consider is virtual separation (2). This refers to the 
imposition by the regulator of an obligation to achieve full equivalence in the 
services offered to internal and external customers without any physical 
separation of networks, signalling systems, business premises etc. Vertical 
separation thus effectively requires a reengineering only of the transactions 
boundary to achieve equivalence, but no change in the underlying 
production processes. Virtual separation might be achieved, inefficiently, by 
degrading the quality of services provided to internal customers (for 
example, the speed with which orders are transmitted and processed) or by 
upgrading services provided to external customers. Virtual separation is 
likely to be much less costly than more comprehensive 'physical' separation. 
The key issue here is the actual and perceived feasibility of achieving full 
equivalence in such circumstances; both are important since lack of trust in 
the arrangements will deter investments by competitors almost as severely 
as actual discrimination. Still, as this approach has not yet been tried in the 
context of achieving full equivalence, it is only possible to speculate about 
how it would work and what it would cost. However, its similarity to previous 
attempts to outlaw non-discrimination, which in several jurisdictions are 
regarded as failure, is a handicap. 
The next step up (3) involves physical business separation, which 
requires reworking of underlying business practices and not just changes at 
the transaction boundary, as with virtual separation. The aim is to segregate 
particular assets and other inputs within a separate unit, which then trades 
using identical processes with both internal and external customers in way 
that can be verified transparently. 
However the separation is not complete; otherwise we would be 
observing something equivalent to full ownership separation. Instead, the 
firms' assets can be separated in different degrees, as shown below: 
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These can be separated at a cost. 
Labour force Separate units can have different internal labour market – i.e. no 
movement between them, or they can be integrated 
Brand The organisations can bear the same or different means, or a 
compromise – e.g. 'x' a division of 'y' corporation 
Management 
information systems 
Their separation will increase trust in prohibitions on illegitimate 
information transfers across the boundary 
Strategy Strategy, especially strategic investment decisions, such as 
construction of a fibre to the node (FTTN) network, is likely to fall 
to the main board and not be 'separated'. 
There seems no obvious impediment to a high degree of separation of 
processes, support systems, management information systems, labour 
forces and brands. Clearly each process will have associated costs, which 
will have to be taken into account in the regulatory impact appraisal. 
The separation of major investment decisions in the access network 
raises more formidable problems. Such a large investment has clear 
commercial and financing implications at the group level, yet it can be used 
anti-competitively. One non-European incumbent justified an acknowledged 
loss-making investment in a network for the delivery of broadcast services 
on the grounds that it was a 'telephony defence measure' - it prevented a 
rival operator proposing to offer telephony and  broadcast services on a 
single network from making headway in the telephony market. The UK 
regime for operational separation (described below) requires that any 
investment in access products are considered solely on their own merits, 
and do not take account of increases in downstream profits. It is not clear, 
however, a) whether this is a big problem, and b) how it can be policed, 
although the local incentive arrangements described below may go some 
way to defuse it.  
The next level of separation (4) involves incentives for senior managers 
in the separated entity, and if externally imposed, it involves more detailed 
regulation not only of the transaction boundary and production processes, 
but also of the relations of production of the separated services. The simple 
argument in favour of separation is that, in the absence of appropriate 
incentives, senior managers will maximise group shareholder value rather 
than divisional profits, as a means of personal advancement and a response 
to share options. This may lead executives to practice discrimination against 
competitors whose success in downstream market would otherwise 
jeopardise group profit. To prevent this, managerial remuneration should be 
tied to divisional performance and (where possible) restrictions should be 
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imposed on the movement of senior staff from the separated unit to the 
group. 
A further escalation of measures in a similar vein (5) would require the 
creation of a divisional board with non-executive directors independent of the 
group. This could take the extra form of legal separation (6), a regime in 
which a separate board is created and separate statutory accounts are filed - 
all designed to emphasise and support the independence of the separated 
entity. These options represent the highest degrees of operational 
separation listed above. 
Six separation options have been described with their associated internal  
behavioural rules. Running in parallel are enforcement mechanisms. These 
can be internal or external. For example, the group can set up an 
independent complaints body to investigate the conduct of the separated 
entity. Alternatively, the regulator can investigate and impose sanctions for 
breaches of license conditions or of undertakings. As in other areas of 
activities, an effective external enforcement system with a high level of 
deterrence can, to some degree, secure the achievement of goals that go 
against the grain of a company's or a manager's incentives. Equally, a well-
designed incentive mechanism can relieve the pressure of enforcement. 
Before evaluating the alternatives listed here, it is worth briefly reviewing 
the development of operational separation by BT in the UK. 
  Operational separation in the UK 
This article does not examine the genesis of the undertakings relating to 
the form of operational separation offered by BT to Ofcom (and accepted by 
Ofcom) in September 2005, but simply describes their provisions and impact 
to date. 
The undertakings offered by BT fell within the framework not of sector-
specific regulation, but of UK competition law, in the form of the Enterprise 
Act 2002. Breaches of the undertakings lay BT open to fines and to legal 
action by private parties. 
In terms of the distinctions made in the section above, the separation 
chosen is between access (including backhaul) and non-access (core and 
retail) services and involves 'business separation' with local managerial 
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incentives. It is supported by a complaints and enforcement regime 
described below: 
In more detail, BT undertakings, expressed in a 55-page document 
(Ofcom, 2005b), are as follows: 
• To establish an operationally separated access services divisions 
(subsequently named Openreach), located on separate premises;  
• To ensure full equivalence for key access products by the following 
dates: 
- IPStream- December 31st 2005 
- metallic path facility-June 30th 2006 
- shared metallic path facility- June 30th 2006 
- backhaul extension service-September 30th 2006 
- wholesale analogue line rental-June 30th 2007 
- wholesale ISDN2 line rental-September 30th 2007 
- wholesale ISDN line rental-December 31st 2007; 
• To establish an equality of access board (EAB) with a majority of 
independent members to police BT's adherence to the undertakings; 
• To consult on the development of its next generation networks. 
To date, an access services division has been established under the 
name of Openreach; fully equivalent services are available for IPStream and 
local loops: the EAB has been established; and collaboration on NGNs has 
progressed via an industry group called NGNUK. BT's progress in meeting 
its key performance indicators is shown in BT (2006a and b). 
Ofcom has also conducted a survey (Ofcom 2006) of BT's wholesale 
customers of Openreach and BT Wholesale (which provides wholesale 
services not provided by Openreach). This survey concluded that not much 
had changed so far. Openreach management was enthusiastic and 
approachable, but there were doubts whether it would deliver, doubts which 
were reinforced by Openreach's teething problems. Respondent identified 
priorities as: 
- scaling up staff, 
- focusing on resolving hands-on operational and service issues, 
- ensuring that focus on equivalence "does not result in the lowest 
common denominator and, consequently, 'equally poor' instead of 
'equally good' services for all concerned". 
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On the cost side, BT's Annual Report and Accounts for 2006 record a 
specific item for operational expenditure of £70 million for the estimated 
incremental and directly attributable cost arising from the obligation to set up 
Openreach. 
  Conclusions and proposals 
The UK experience of functional separation is still in its infancy, but 
regulators close to the process have detected a major  change in the way 
BT's anti-discrimination obligation now operates. Previously it was fuzzy, 
responding to the injunction: "do not discriminate in a way which has a 
material effect on competition". Scores of complaints from competitors were 
investigated and inquiries by the regulator undertaken, not one of which led 
to a formal finding adverse to BT. 
The new requirement in the undertakings, by contrast, is sharper – the 
'bright line' of full equivalence of services supplied to internal and external 
customers – and for that reason much more easily verifiable and justifiable. 
It is supported by a complaints body, which is still finding its way, and a 
senior management incentive scheme only recently completed. It is also 
combined with a major change in BT's strategy and rhetoric. The company 
now denies that it benefits in the UK from the advantages of incumbency. 
Instead it sees as its key strategic advantage its ability first to succeed in a 
more symmetrical home market and to take the benefit of that experience 
abroad in the lucrative market for corporate telecommunications services in 
Europe and the wider world, where it will face incumbents still enjoying , but 
about to lose, the fruits of continued discriminatory behaviour. Hence its 
incessant support for regulatory interventions, which draw down the benefit 
of incumbency elsewhere and create level playing fields everywhere. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the outcome of operational separation in the UK 
will be the joint product of regulation and this strategic shift. 
In the UK, operational separation emerged as an undertaking in a 
procedure under ex post competition law (the Enterprise Act 2002). This 
enabled the competition authority in the UK (which, in the communication 
sector, is also Ofcom, the NRA) to accept undertakings in lieu of a reference 
to the UK's Competition Commission. No other member state has the same 
legislation, even though competition authorities in others have access to 
powers under an EU Regulation (no. 1, 2003) which permits the break-up of 
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a company found to have infringed competition law, if it can be shown that 
no alternative behavioural remedy is equally effective. In some 
circumstances, this could be used to promote operational separation, but the 
process would be tortuous. It seems, therefore, that any widespread and 
timely recourse to operational separation with the EU would have to be 
achieved via ex ante regulation, through revised Framework and Access 
Directives. 
A possible new remedy under their Directives is outlined below, but it is 
important that this remedy be applied proportionately. This requires that the 
detriments resulting from non-price discrimination exceed the costs of 
imposing an operational separation remedy, where those costs are not only 
those of changing the incumbents' business processes, but also of any 
chilling effect on investment in new assets, by both the incumbent and 
competitors. 
Ofcom undertook an analysis of the regulatory history of key access 
products, which led it to the conclusion that BT had been obstructive in their 
provision. It also undertook a careful analysis of the scope for competition in 
various markets, in order to delineate those services which were immune 
from competitive pressure in the medium term, and hence should be placed 
in the separated access services division. 
Any NRA proposing to avail itself of a new operational separation remedy 
should undertake the same analysis. It would also be desirable if some form 
of scrutiny of remedies, by the Commission or the European Regulators 
Group, were in place to prevent 'copy-cat' use of a fairly draconian remedy 
Operational separation would have to appear as a new or enhanced 
discrimination remedy, or a combined transparency / discrimination remedy, 
normally accompanied by accounting separation and some form of price 
control.  
A Directive has only to set out the broad terms of an obligation, leaving it 
to national legislation or the NRA to fill in the details. The remedy should 
also be as parsimonious as possible, to avoid micro-management by the 
NRA of the SMP operator's conduct.  
This involves consideration of what provisions are indispensable to the 
achievement of the goal of eliminating non-price discrimination by 
operational separation. The essence of the remedy is the creation of a 
uniform transaction boundary for internal and external customers at which a 
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'bright line' test of equivalence can be performed. This will involve separation 
of an appropriate number of the physical inputs into the production process 
enumerated above. This paper suggests that all of those considered 
(premises, OSS, labour, brand, MIS and there may be more) can be 
separated, if necessary. Incentive and governance changes seem an  issue 
of a different order, as they concern the relations of production within the 
access component of the firm, not what transpires on the boundary. Equally, 
a requirement can be made for an internal complaints and monitoring 
process, but an expanded regulator-driven process can (perhaps 
inefficiently) substitute an internal process, and must in any case lie behind 
such an internal process should the latter fail. In other words, with business 
separation in force, there is scope for substitution among the sustaining 
mechanisms of incentive changes, governance arrangements and internal 
and external appeal mechanisms. The details of such arrangements can be 
crafted by NRAs, if they find such a remedy necessary and proportionate. 
A further point of difference between a putative operational separation 
remedy and other current remedies in the Directives is that separation in its 
nature might apply to several SMP markets simultaneously, rather than the 
single market now analysed and remedied under the current Access 
Directive. 
Taking these points into account, an operational separation remedy could 
be designed as a general article, accompanied by a non-binding annex, 
which listed some of the dimensions of intervention that NRAs would take 
into account. An example of such an approach is given below: 
"Whereas 
Concerns about non-price discrimination on the part of access seekers 
may deter entry into the supply of electronic communications services, 
and in some circumstances can only be resolved by imposing a regime 
of full equivalence in the supply of access or wholesale products more 
generally to internal (affiliated) customers and external customers; it is 
thus important that NRAs dispose of effective remedies to ensure such 
equivalence. 
This can be achieved by imposing operational separation on the 
access provider, ensuring that a range of products using non-replicable 
assets are transferred to customers in fully equivalent form. This 
requires the separation of the business process involved in the 
production of the specified services from those involved in other retail 
and wholesale products; this separation of business process may be 
accompanied by incentive and governance changes. 
102   No. 64, 4th Q. 2006 
This remedy should be strictly confined to markets where there are 
limited prospects for the development of effective competition. 
ARTICLE X-Obligation to separate the production of specified access 
products operationally 
1. A national regulatory agency, in the interest of transparency and 
non-discrimination, may impose obligations on operators to prevent 
non-price discrimination by means of a separation of inputs into 
specified access products and other downstream markets. The 
obligation will extend to requiring exact equivalence in the nature of the 
access service and the process by which it is acquired by all 
customers. Such products must therefore be sold at  the same  prices 
and the same terms and conditions (including price and service levels), 
by means of the same systems and processes. 
2. The NRA may also impose obligations relating to the transfer of 
information between the access provider and its customers, to ensure 
that affiliated organisations do not benefit form insider knowledge. 
3. The precise form of the remedy will be chosen by the NRA. The 
annex identifies options relating firstly to the inputs in the production 
process which may require separation and secondly to a range of 
relevant supporting measures. 
4. The NRA may choose to apply this measure to several markets 
simultaneously, thereby creating a single operationally separated set of 
access services. 
ANNEX 
The inputs or activities subject to separation may include (non-
exhaustively) the following: 
-premises, 
-labour force and the creation of a firm-specific (internal) labour 
market, 
-brands, 
-operational support system, 
-management information systems. 
The NRA may also impose supporting measures including (non-
exhaustively): 
-restrictions on the incentive systems for senior managers to be 
employed by the separated business; 
-an internal complaints and appeals body, which may be made up of a 
majority of outside members, with a duty to communicate its 
evaluations and conclusions to the NRA; 
-rules governing the operation of company boards supervising the 
production of access services." 
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